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Abstract: 
Feminist scholars interested in the political ideas of Giorgio Agamben have 
had to negotiate the 'gender-blindness’ of his writing and the absence from 
his theory of women’s bodies. They are nevertheless sometimes prepared to 
appropriate the concept of 'bare life’ as if it were in itself relatively unaffected 
by its original frame, and easily extricated from it. On the contrary, I argue 
that gender difference poses fundamental problems for the schema of 'bare 
life’. Female bodies are not simply missing from Homo Sacer, but included 
as an absence in the universalising 'man’ that is the protagonist of Agamben’s 
discourse. As such they play an occluded role in founding Agamben’s au-
thority. I explore the implications of this further in more recent works where 
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the female body does play an explicit role, in the form of the 'nymph’. Here 
I show that this insistently feminine figure, whose political implications have 
not often been considered, acts as a specular supplement to an ostensibly uni-
versal, but implicitly masculine, 'man’. I conclude by exploring the drama of 
castration in Agamben’s work on art as a function of the mastery to which 
his writing aspires, and which sits uneasily with his critique of sovereignty. 
 




Whatever: Giorgio Agamben’s Gender Trouble1 
 
In recent years, a number of feminist scholars in a variety of fields have 
turned to the political work of Giorgio Agamben for inspiration.2 Although 
they are generally wary of what Catherine Mills has called the ‘gender-blind-
ness’ of Agamben’s work,3 there is a sense that his conceptual framework 
 
1 My thanks to Daniela Caselli for her invaluable help with this article. 
2 Ann Marie Smith, ‘Neo-eugenics: A Feminist Critique of Agamben, in Occasions 1:2 (2011); Al-
laine Cerwonka and Anna Loutfi, ‘Biopolitics and the Female Reproductive Body as the New 
Subject of Law’, in feminists@law 1:1 (2011); Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo, Race, Gender 
and the Body in British Immigration Control: Subject to Examination (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2014). 





can be useful to feminism, and that his gender limitations are worth overcom-
ing. Thus Ewa Płonowska Ziarek suggests that, with ‘some fundamental re-
visions’, the concept of ‘bare life’ can ‘open new interpretations of the bio-
politics of race and gender’.4 According to this reading, Agamben’s gender 
limitations would be relatively extrinsic to the key concept of ‘bare life’, such 
that the latter could be extricated from the former, intact. Penelope 
Deutscher’s intervention, on the other hand—which has been the most influ-
ential, as well as the most sceptical and exacting—raises more fundamental 
objections to the usefulness of ‘bare life’. What would happen, Deutscher 
asks, if the ‘politicized life’ under discussion were periodically qualified as 
‘born of women’s bodies’? For one thing, the foetus might present a limit 
case for ‘bare life’. The analogy may seem tempting insofar as the foetus can 
be seen as a minimal, liminal form of human life, and to this extent like ‘bare 
life’. But what, then, would we do with Agamben’s dire warnings about bare 
life’s absolute exposure to violence, or the ‘killability’ of homo sacer? Would 
one, Deutscher asks, have to liken the woman’s body to a death camp, or the 
woman herself to a sinister sovereign?5 It seems, then, that the notion of ‘bare 
life’ in itself may be a problematic fit, at least for the defence of reproductive 
rights. Deutscher in any case wishes to ‘open a debate’ with Agamben over 
 
4 Ewa Płonowska Ziarek, Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2012), p.154. 
5 Penelope Deutscher, ‘The Inversion of Exceptionality: Foucault, Agamben, and “Reproductive 
Rights”, in South Atlantic Quarterly 107:1 (Winter 2008), 55-70, pp.66-67. 
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the broader problem of his ‘nonengagement’ with women’s bodies, which 
are ‘impressively absent’ from his writing. She initially, and perhaps diplo-
matically, suggests that this absence may be ‘one of the doubtless unintended 
by-products of his response to Foucault’. But shortly afterwards she upgrades 
it to a ‘non-accident’ (Deutscher 57-59), and with this raises the possibility 
that women’s bodies may be not just ‘impressively’ but systemically absent. 
This more radical possibility has not, however, prevented subsequent schol-
ars who enage with Deutscher, yet continue to see Agamben’s ideas as useful, 
from declaring his ‘sex blindness [...] immaterial from a feminist perspective’ 
(Cerwonka and Loutfi). 
The debate is thus framed in terms of the usefulness of concepts drawn 
from one area of critical thinking for another. But it seems to me that in this 
way the more radical possibilities of Deutscher’s critique are lost. For if, as 
Deutscher seems to suggest, the absence of women’s bodies is in some way 
constitutive of Agamben’s discourse, it may be that Agamben needs feminist 
theory more than feminist theory needs Agamben; that is, that feminist theory 
might offer a privileged perspective on fundamental problems with his theo-
ries. In this case, it would no longer be a case of what feminism can learn 
from Agamben, but what Agamben might learn from feminism. In advancing 
this line of argument it is not, however, my contention that women’s bodies 
are simply absent from Agamben’s work; and this for two distinct but com-
plementary reasons.  
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Firstly, in Homo sacer itself women’s bodies are not simply absent but, 
to pastiche Agamben’s own language, constantly included in the form of an 
exclusion, in the homo or uomo of Agamben’s discourse. Indeed, if we are to 
take this ‘man’ as it seems to want to be taken—as a universal term only 
adventitiously gendered masculine—it must, implicitly, undertake to include 
femininity. The corollary of this, however, is that the universal ‘man’ func-
tions discursively much like the ‘zone of indifferentiation’ in which Agam-
ben says the bad universal of ‘bare life’ is produced. The fatal role thus ac-
corded to a process of indifferentiation ought to make us wary of any univer-
sal produced by the simple elision of difference. Curiously enough, Agamben 
had already proposed, in La comunità che viene (1990), a form of indifferen-
tiation, a ‘qualunque’ or ‘whatever’ identity, as a utopian goal. There must, 
thus, be some question as to what separates these forms of indifferentiation, 
leading on the one hand to disaster, and on the other to salvation. Moreover, 
since Agamben’s critique putatively falls on the hither side of either of these 
termini, his ‘gender-blindness’ potentially constitutes a third form of indif-
ference, whose relation to the other two is not immediately clear. If, in short, 
it gestures towards the utopian ‘qualunque’, it risks equally conveying the 
casual dismissal of the English demotic ‘whatever’.6 Whichever way we cut 
it, we cannot remain indifferent to Agamben’s indifference. 
 
6 I should stress that the Italian word ‘qualunque’ itself is not used in this latter way. 
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The rare and brief moments in Homo sacer where bodies expressly 
sexed female do appear are thus of great interest. In these moments, little 
ripples of an unwonted gender-differentiation disturb, if only at the level of 
grammar, the otherwise placid progress of Agamben’s universal. But if this 
disturbance is marked, in the play of gendered pronouns, its implications for 
the theory go seemingly unremarked. In one striking instance, this occurs in 
a vignette set in the Nazi death camps, the exemplary scene of bare life. The 
resurgence of sexual difference in the very heart of the zone of indifferentia-
tion ought to cast a troubling light back on Agamben’s universal. Yet these 
differences are quickly and silently subsumed, and the universal uomo recov-
ers its monolithic solidity and goes on as before. Given that this universal 
uomo is also, so to speak, the constituent subject of Agamben’s theoretical 
mastery—or, if you will, his sovereignty—this poses fundamental questions 
for his entire project. What if the theory itself effectively mimics the horrify-
ing process it describes? It is important, then, not to think in terms of a simple 
absence of women’s bodies. Certainly, there is a theoretical deficit here that 
cannot be set right simply by inventing, as Ronit Lentin has done, a ‘femina 
sacra’ as a sort of bride of homo sacer.7 Rather I propose to accentuate these 
moments where a difference that is routinely subsumed and elided does break 
 
7 Ronit Lentin, ‘“No Woman's Law Will Rot This State”: The Israeli Racial State and Feminist Re-




cover, the better to understand the difficulties it poses for the otherwise seem-
ingly docile universal that underpins Agamben’s mastery. 
The second sense in which women’s bodies are present in Agamben’s 
work in any case makes the invention of any supplementary figure of fem-
inity redundant. For, since the time Lentin and Deutscher were writing, 
Agamben has been, in a manner of speaking, busily setting the absence of 
female bodies in his work to rights. His interest in the figure of the nymph 
dates back at least to 1975. But in Ninfe (2007; trans. 2011) and Signatura 
rerum (2008; trans. 2009), this figure of ‘the feminine body in motion’ sud-
denly moves centre stage.8 It is perhaps surprising that these works have not 
attracted more attention from feminists and gender theorists; Heather Warren 
Crow is a notable exception.9 It may be that this work is simply taking time 
to filter through into publication. But it may also be that, in seeming to ad-
dress different disciplinary concerns, it hails a different audience. For schol-
ars dealing expressly with political theory, the work on homo sacer may thus 
remain the obvious locus. Such disciplinary determination can have some 
odd effects. Judith Butler’s comments on Agamben in Precarious Life, for 
 
8 Giorgio Agamben, Ninfe (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007; repr. 2012); Signatura rerum: Sul 
metodo (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2008). 
9 Heather Warren-Crow, Girlhood and the Plastic Image (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth 




instance, although highly pertinent, have nothing to say on the gender dimen-
sion of his work.10 Meanwhile, where Agamben’s nymphs have been re-
ceived it is generally in the frame of visual culture, often with little reference 
to his political theory. Nevertheless, the specular relation and implicit gen-
dering of subject-positions the nymphs articulate can help to illuminate the 
problematic gendering of homo sacer. Agamben, I will argue, is the con-
sistent albeit passive heir to discourses in which femininity is always for the 
subject of discourse, and which posit it as the bearer of a life whose subject 
it can never be. Because Agamben never problematises this position, and in-
deed the arrow of critique is always pointing in some other direction, he also 
inherits a tacit and seemingly impregnable masculine subjectivity, which is 
complicit with a quasi-messianic ambition to master and own the discourse 
of disenchantment.  It is this matter of mastery, and the rhetorical features of 
theoretical writing that make it compelling, that concern me. This is, how-
ever, more a cautionary tale than a polemic. What I ultimately want to show 
is how the sad sovereign of a humiliated humanity is inevitably haunted by 




10 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2006; 
first publ. 2004). 
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In the first volume of Homo sacer, Agamben conjures the eponymous ‘sacred 
man’ to confront what he says is the ‘decisive event of Modernity’; that is, 
‘the politicisation of bare life’, whose paradoxical corollary has been the ap-
parent ‘eclipse’ of politics.11 This homo sacer is, to be sure, a rather obscure 
figure from Roman law, which designates a subject so far beyond the pale of 
human society as to be absolutely killable, with no question of homicide or 
need for legal justification. But it is also, Agamben suggests, a distant echo 
of the condition of all humans under what he calls the ‘sovereign ban’, a sort 
of primal scene of politics, a hyperbolic state of exception implicated in the 
foundation of any polity, where everything hangs in the balance, and at the 
sovereign’s behest, but as yet unprovided with whatever rights or protections 
it may have to offer. In this moment, the (putatively) Aristotelian distinction 
between the mere life of the organism (zoe) and the life of human projects 
(bios) enters into a zone of indifferentiation, in which human being takes on 
the terribly exposed condition of ‘bare life’. What this archaic fable has to do 
with Modernity is not, perhaps, immediately apparent. But Agamben insists 
that the sovereign ban is not the sort of event that is ever ‘completed once 
and for all in illo tempore [in that particular time]’, but rather it is reenacted 
constantly, in any polis (HS 121). Thus it persists, as ‘the hidden foundation 
 
11 Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita (Turin: Einaudi, 1995/2005), 
pp.6-7. All translations are my own. 
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on which the entire political system rests’ (HS 12); and, with particular em-
phasis, as ‘the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity’ (HS 135). 
Because it is hidden, ‘we must learn to recognise’ how the archaic structure 
of the sovereign ban continues to shape political relations today (HS 123). If 
we do not, the fate of stateless refugees under the floundering, misconceived 
impotence of universal human rights, will be the fate of all, and we already 
have a model for the terminus of this trajectory in the Nazi death camps. As 
these barbarisms show, Modernity marks the remorseless advance of this 
devastating force towards an imminent endgame, in which we will all ulti-
mately be engulfed. By the same token, this terrible danger presents some-
thing like an opportunity, insofar as our present nihilism ‘is nothing other 
than [...] the emergence into the light of this relation as such’ (HS 59). Thus 
we teeter on the edge, between the most awful catastrophe, and some sort of 
revelation or transfiguration.  
Agamben has, shall we say, a weakness for a certain apocalyptic tone. 
In his peroration, he mentions Foucault’s hope, at the end of the first volume 
of the History of Sexuality, for a new ‘economy of bodies and pleasures’, but 
suggests that his own study makes such a thing doubtful: the very concept of 
the body is always already caught in the problematic he has been outlining, 
and there is no way of reconfiguring it that can offer ‘firm ground against the 
claims of sovereign power’ (HS 209). Nor is there any way back, whether 
with Leo Strauss or Hannah Arendt, to the classic distinctions between zoe 
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and bios, private and political life: ‘From the camps, there is no way back 
towards classical politics; in them, city and home became indistinguishable’ 
(210). So what can we do? 
We must, rather, make of this very biopolitical body, bare life itself, the place in 
which is constituted and installed a form of life entirely poured into bare life, a 
bios that is only its own zoe. 
Occorrerà, piuttosto, fare dello stesso corpo biopolitico, della nuda vita stessa il 
luogo in cui si costituisce e s’insedia una forma di vita tutta versata nella nuda vita, 
un bíos che è solo la sua zoḗ . (HS 210) 
The perversity of this imperative, urging us in what might seem precisely the 
wrong direction, is doubtless a large part of its theoretical glamour. Such a 
move could be understood under the sign of a sort of negative dialectics, as 
an attempt to have done with transcendence. And yet this promise—that we 
might, one day, have done with transcendence—for all that it aspires to a sort 
of negative messianism, comes perilously close to straightforward messian-
ism. The mystery surrounding what, precisely, it will be necessary (occor-
rerà) to do does nothing to dispel this impression. In what precise manner 
should life be ‘poured into’ bare life such as to avoid succumbing to the ter-
rible defencelessness of that state?12 It is a strangely empty revelation and, 
since the ‘nothing of revelation’ is—as Agamben has argued earlier apropos 
 
12 I have preferred this rather awkward and literal translation of ‘versata nella’ over the ‘ex-
hausted in’ of the standard English translation, which doubtless makes more sense, precisely to 
retain a sense of the strangeness of the figure, and the enigma of the process to which it al-
ludes. See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. by Daniel Hel-
ler-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.105. 
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of Gershom Scholem’s comments on Kafka’s ‘Before the Law’—the prerog-
ative of the sovereign (HS 59), this may explain why I feel strangely op-
pressed.  And yet, as Agamben moves towards his conclusion, it seems he 
really does mean that the way beyond the terrible grip of sovereign power on 
bare life is to give ourselves over entirely to bare life. Seemingly, if we con-
ceive of this new form of life as form-of-life, or ‘lifeform’ in something like 
the Natural History sense, we will see opening up ‘a field [un campo] of re-
search that lies beyond [al di là] that which is defined by the intersection of 
politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence’ (HS 
211). The rather infelicitous occurrence of the word ‘campo’ here inadvert-
ently underscores the terrible risk of such a strategy. For the ‘campo’ with 
which we have been mainly concerned in Homo sacer is the death camp; 
determined, what is more, as a place of research, into human beings treated 
zoologically, as lifeforms. What distinguishes Agamben’s new, salvific 
‘campo’ of research from the ‘campo’ that is the exemplar of catastrophe, 
beyond a bare, tendentious ‘al di là’? 
Agamben has indeed dealt with the issue of pseudo-medical research 
on camp inmates in an earlier section entitled ‘VP’, after the Versuchsperson 
or guinea pig of Nazi experimentation. And this is one of the disappearingly 
small number of places in Homo sacer where female bodies make a sudden, 
and troubling, appearance. In a long parenthesis, instancing ‘research’ into 
the reanimation of subjects chilled by long exposure to cold water, Agamben 
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notes as ‘particularly grotesque’ those experiments into the use of ‘animal 
warmth’, in which the VP was placed ‘between two bare women’; and in 
which, on one occasion, the VP even ‘succeeded in having a sexual relation, 
which facilitated the process of recovery’ (HS 172). Since the camps are al-
ready axiomatically the worst, one is bound to ask what makes this scene 
particularly grotesque. The sex act itself is doubtless the focus of a peculiar 
confusion of pathos. Simply to affirm the liveliness of a sex act so overdeter-
mined by its zoological frame would be in disastrously bad taste. Yet simply 
to express disgust would be to betray whatever humanity there might be in 
the scene. Can we ever hope to resolve this into an appropriate response? 
Agamben, at any rate, places a cordon sanitaire round the sex act, framing it 
as something ‘attested’, presumably by the Nazi medic ventriloquised in the 
troublingly dry remark that closes the parenthesis: ‘which aided recovery’. In 
this way, our attention is shifted back from the act of sex itself to the act of 
spectatorship. And any charge of prurience devolves upon the zoological 
gaze itself, with its grotesque affectation of scientific disinterest.  
But might we not, then, read Agamben’s parentheses themselves as 
walls, immuring the entire scene? And might this not suggest that the gro-
tesque has already begun with the simple apparition of ‘two bare women, also 
[anch’esse] Jewish prisoners from the camps’? Since these bare women are 
‘also’ Jewish camp inmates, they too ought to be, purely and simply, in-
stances of bare life. But they are doubly marked here as also-instances: the 
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apparent need to qualify them as ‘also’ suggests some difference between 
them and the bare life that lies between them. Maybe, then, sexual intercourse 
is only the narrative culmination of a difference or relation that is already 
somehow excessive and troubling in itself, one that is laid bare by a naked-
ness that is not identical to the nakedness of bare life. If this is so, a further 
question suggests itself: are these parentheses between which this difference 
makes this very rare appearance the visible trace of a bracketing elsewhere 
effected more completely, and in silence? 
This last thesis is not as speculative as it sounds. Such a bracketing 
occurs every time Homo sacer deploys the words homo or uomo in their pu-
tative universality, conflating human with man. Agamben’s thesis is that the 
sovereign ban places all human being in a ‘zone of indifferentiation’, produc-
ing ‘bare life’. But the word ‘uomo’ or ‘man’ claims a similar power, insofar 
as it affects to make sexual difference disappear. Given that this is the sover-
eign gesture par excellence, might we not suspect a certain theoretical vio-
lence? The traces of this violence are most evident where, as in the previous 
instance, Agamben feels somehow obliged to distinguish female bodies. So, 
at a certain point, he feels it is necessary to insist that the vitae necisque 
potestas, the ‘power of life and death’ in Roman law, should not be confused 
with a father or husband’s right to kill a wife or daughter caught in flagrante; 
or with a master’s right over his slaves. Rather, it is strictly a father’s right 
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over his son. For some pages thereafter Agamben is unusually gender-spe-
cific, naming ‘i cittadini maschi’, emphatically ‘male citizens’. The problem 
is that Agamben also wants to claim that it is precisely because this power 
exceeds the ambit of the household, and invests ‘every free male citizen’ 
from birth, that it may serve as the very model of political power; based, that 
is, ‘not on simple natural life, but on life exposed to death’ (HS 97-100). The 
wife or daughter exposed to domestic violence may be suprised to learn that 
they are not sufficiently ‘exposed to death’. Meanwhile the son may take 
some comfort in the fact that his submission to power is a prerequisite for 
inheriting it. All of this is doubtless true of patrician and patriarchal Rome; 
but Agamben’s habit of universalising the archaic as a conceptual archè risks 
uncritically countersigning patriarchy in the very foundations of Modernity. 
 Such ripples in the theory only make themselves felt because female 
bodies suddenly appear; so why does Agamben mention them at all? One 
answer might be that suppressing them can equally produce some bizarre re-
sults. Thus the brothels of Sade’s pamphlet Français, encore un effort si vous 
voulez être républicains—which features in La Philosophie du boudoir, sub-
titled Dialogues destinées à l’éducation des jeunes demoiselles—become the 
political locus par excellence ‘where any citizen [cittadino] can publicly sum-
mon any other to oblige him to satisfy his own desires’ (HS 149). Although 
Sade is by no means averse to sexual action between male citizens, ‘cittadino’ 
evidently fails to do justice to his encyclopedic ambitions with regard to the 
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manner and orientation of coupling. Agamben’s gendering of the term is, on 
the other hand, faithful to the political theatre of which he says the brothel is 
a hyperbolic microcosm. For, as he tells us, the French Revolution instituted 
modern biopolitics by making ‘birth’ or ‘nativity’ (la nascita) the ‘foundation 
of sovereignty and law’. This politics and Agamben’s discourse alike thus 
include female bodies, but only insofar as they are implicit in the substantiv-
ised past participle ‘nascita’, making them the bearers of a life that may, pro-
vided it is emphatically male, go on to bear the political rights of a cittadino, 
but which they themselves, as the bearers of that life, will never bear.13 Again, 
having nothing to say on this matter, Agamben’s schema leaves women in a 
position seemingly so abject as to make the supposed disaster of bare life 
seem positively hopeful. As I move on to explore Agamben’s nymphs, it is 




The ‘nymph’ first appears in Agamben’s early (1975) essay ‘Aby Warburg 
and the Nameless Science’,14 and comes to prominence again more recently 
 
13 The theory and history of women’s rights after 1789 is complex, and some women did, of 
course, play notable political, historical, and symbolic roles. But it is broadly true to say that the 
move to exclude women from full citizenship prevailed. 
14 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Aby Warburg and the Nameless Science’, in Potentialities: Collected Es-




in Ninfe (2007), and Signatura rerum (2008). In each case, Agamben gives a 
privileged place to Aby Warburg’s unfinished Bilderatlas Mnemosyne, a 
‘picture-atlas’ consisting of sixty-three panels, each covered with a collage 
of reproductions, sketches, and photographs illustrating a different Pa-
thosformel, or ‘feeling formula’. In Signatura rerum, Agamben calls upon 
panel forty-six, in which each image is ‘in some way in relation to the theme’ 
of the ‘feminine figure in movement’, to illustrate his notion of a paradigm 
as a fluid constellation in which ‘none of the images is the original, just as 
none of the images is simply a copy or repetition’ (SR 30-31). In other words, 
the panel defies the usual hierarchies of exemplarity. Crucial to this determi-
nation, as so often in Agamben’s comments on modern art, is the patently 
second-order and cut-up nature of the images—they are clippings, photos, 
sketches, excerpts—and the techniques of collage and montage used to as-
semble them. What is supposed to emerge from this, rather than an exhaus-
tive catalogue or genetic account of the topic ‘nymph’, is something more 
dialectically restless: the nymph ‘is the paradigm of the single images and the 
single images are the paradigms of the nymph’ (SR 31). 
The fact remains, nevertheless, that it is always panel 46 and its 
nymphs which serve, paradoxically, as the exemplar of this disturbance of 
exemplarity. Maybe this is why Agamben introduces it so coyly. Take panel 
46, he says—‘Sia la tavola 46’ (SR 30), or ‘Si prenda la Pathosformel Ninfa’ 
(N 17)—as if he might just as well have chosen another example. Only he 
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never does. The question that follows in both texts—‘where is the nymph?’ 
(SR 30; N 18)—is likewise in bad faith, its epistemological wistfulness al-
ready belied by the privilege Agamben gives to one of Warburg’s images 
over all the others. This is ‘Fraulein Schnellbring’, a fruit-bearing servant 
excerpted from a fresco of Ghirlandaio, in whose retinue the other images 
trail, as what there is ‘[b]esides Ghirlandaio’s fresco’ (SR 30). One might 
speculate that what grants her this preeminence is the distinctive step, with 
the heel of the back foot sharply lifted, made famous by the Gradiva of Jensen 
and Freud. Agamben does not make this connection, but other critics have.15 
The explicit mark of her privilege, however, is the byname which Warburg 
and his collaborator André Jolles ‘familiarly’ (SR 30) or ‘jokingly’ (N 17-
18) gave her in the whimsical correspondence they devoted to her. This jok-
ingly familiar view of a female servant who, hilariously, ‘brings quickly’, is 
furthermore laced with playfully gratuitous erotic projection. She is, in the 
words of Jolles, as cited by Agamben, ‘the object of my dreams, that trans-
form every time into an enchanting nightmare’ (N 18). If Agamben wishes 
to register any critical or historical distance from such casual, fin-de-siècle 
eroticisation of female domestic service, he does not say so. Then again, nei-
ther do other recent critics such as Spyros Papapetros who declares Fraulein 
 
15 Geoffrey Hartman, ‘Psychoanalysis as a Cultural Ideal: “Form Feeling” in Freud’s Essay on 
“Gradiva”’, American Imago 65:4 (Winter 2008), 505-22; Georges Didi-Huberman, Aperçues 
(Paris: Minuit, 2018); Daniela Sacco, ‘Ninfa e Gradiva: dalla percezione individuale alla memoria 




S—‘amusingly’ in the view of Geoffrey Hartman—‘closer to the headhunt-
ress Judith unwavering in her mission to decapitate Holofernes than to 
Freud’s liberating Gradiva’ (Hartman 519-20).16 Least of all is there any sign 
of concern that this sort of scholarly game might be, as Heather Warren-Crow 
has suggested, ‘a queer interaction’, in which the image of the girl is ‘passed 
back and forth between men’ as ‘the chattel of homosociality’ (Warren-Crow 
116). 
Fraulein S’s Gradivan step, with its distinctively raised back foot, does 
nevertheless arguably have a determining role in the significance of the 
nymph in general. As Geoffrey Hartman suggests, these figures of the ‘fem-
inine figure in motion’ are vehicles for Aby Warburg’s notion of ‘klassische 
Unruhe’, the resurgence of a Dionysian ‘unrest’ within the classical that re-
verses the terms of, and troubles, the German classical ideal of ‘rest in mo-
tion’, or ‘Ruhe in Bewegung’ (Hartman 518-19). What is at stake in this ar-
gument is a reform of German classical education, of Bildung. But we surely 
need also to notice the gendered zoology on which this still tacitly masculine 
Bildung rests. I say ‘zoology’ partly as a nod to Jensen’s Zoë Bertgang, but 
partly also to underline the form of life implicit in this brightly-walking 
lifeform, and its specular nature. In Jensen’s tale, and Freud’s reading, Zoë 
 
16 In support of this reading, one might see in Fraulein S’s gait an echo of a number of quattro-
cento Judiths, albeit not on the trail of Holofernes, but carrying his head in place of a fruit-bowl. 
But, one feels bound to protest, sometimes a fruit-bowl is just a fruit-bowl. And is it in entirely 
good taste to heap an additional burden on a busy servant? 
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is the means for Norbert Hanold of quitting his alienation in the fetishism of 
classical imagery, so as to embrace life in the flesh. Agamben’s Warburgian 
nymphs are, a fortiori, the bearers of life for others. It remains to show the 
work this gendered configuration does for Agamben’s theory. 
In Signatura rerum, the nymph-as-paradigm beats a path for the re-
tooling of the medieval doctrine of ‘signatures’. These, it transpires, are the 
elusive but vital force that allows the paradigm and its instances to remain in 
perfect equilibrium. Signatures are the ‘subtle and inapparent threads’ which 
lead the researcher through the interminable mass of the archive (SR 74). 
They bridge the gulf between semiotics and hermeneutics, for ‘signs would 
not speak if signatures did not make them speak’ (SR 62-63). They are not 
concepts, but that without which concepts would remain ‘inert and unpro-
ductive’ (SR 77). To a degree, then, signatures articulate a version of some-
thing like a reader response theory, but one that involves a curious sort of 
conceptual vitalism. It may be reasonable enough to imply that texts ‘live’ in 
their encounter with interpretation. But Agamben’s signatures themselves 
seem to have some sort of life of their own, independent of the agency of a 
given historian or reader. It is as if there really were a mysterious force that 
could trace a path through a mass of otherwise undifferentiated material, 
lighting up family resemblances between images, and spontaneously drawing 
them into constellations. Indeed, some such force is needed to assure us that 
the community of nymphs is no mere projection; that their constellation is 
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still visible in the starry sky of ideas because it is fired by something like 
Warburg’s Nachleben, the ‘afterlife’ or ‘survival’ of antiquity. 
In Ninfe, Agamben does not speak of signatures, but again his nymphs 
articulate a sort of vitalism, this time in the notion that they are  ‘caricate’ (N 
9, 11, 14, 25, 29). One might render this as ‘freighted’ or ‘loaded’, as with a 
cargo. But it becomes increasingly clear that we should think more of the 
way a battery is ‘charged’. The theme first appears in relation to Bill Viola’s 
The Passions. As slo-mo re-enactments of the group postures of classic paint-
ings, Viola’s video installations embody a certain equivocation between 
movement and stillness. But the crucial moment comes, ‘exemplarily’ in the 
film Greetings, at the point where the actors have ‘recomposed’ Pontormo’s 
Visitation and the images seem to stop, but are ‘in reality charged with time 
[caricate di tempo]’, and imprinted with a sort of tremor: ‘una sorta di trem-
ito’ (N 9). What Agamben is after in his exemplary images is thus a sort of 
pause between movements that seems pregnant with movement even in its 
stillness. This is taken up in his next example, the dance step named ‘fan-
tasma’ by the fifteenth-century dance-master Domenico di Piacenza (N 11-
14), which also serves to develop the relations between memory, imagina-
tion, and movement; and this, in turn, later provides the segue into Walter 
Benjamin’s theory of dialectical images (N 27-32). Such images crystallise 
the dialectic ‘at a standstill’, and as such they have energy, potential; for ‘the 
life of images does not consist in simple immobility, nor in the successive 
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resumption of movement, but in a pause charged with tension between them’ 
(N 29).  
This is also why Agamben’s images always depict ‘un essere di pas-
saggio’ (N 36).  The question is, what is at stake in gathering this ‘being of 
passage’ or ‘passing being’ under the rubric ‘nymph’.17 One rather dismay-
ingly banal answer would be that nymphs, in classical mythology, just are 
elusive, fleeting life forces that animate natural processes, as in the passage 
Walter Benjamin cites from the Palatine Anthology at the end of The Arcades 
Project (Z3), in which it is the nymphs who turn the water-wheel of the mill.18 
Agamben does not cite this passage, and there is perhaps no absolute reason 
why he should. Then again, his discussion of the dialectical image in Ninfe 
cites no images, seemingly preferring to operate on a formal, conceptual 
plane above mere examples. We might deem this a determinate omission if 
we once thought that the wheels of this ostensibly formalist argument were 
secretly driven by mere thematic content. Agamben privileges Benjamin’s 
fragment N3,1 as coming closest to giving a definition of the concept (N 27). 
But in Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century, Benjamin gives another sort 
of definition when he announces, as the crowning instance of the dialectical 
 
17 One might also think of Benjamin’s remarks in the Passagenwerk, on prostitutes and other 
denizens of the ‘Passagen’; the arcades or ‘passages’. 
18 Walter Benjamin, Das Passagenwerk Vol. 2 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982), p.851; The Ar-





image, ‘the whore, who is seller and ware in one’: ‘die Hure, die Verkäuferin 
und Ware in einem ist’ (P I 55; AP 10).19  This figure that haunts the passages 
of Paris later turns up again in the section ‘O Prostitution, Spiel’, in a passage 
taken from Alfred Delvau: 
It’s a pleasure to see them walking on this asphalt, the dress racily hitched up, right 
to the knee, so as to leave sparkling in the sun a leg fine and nervous like that of 
an arab horse, full of adorable quiverings and impatience, and ending in calf-length 
leather boots of an irreproachable elegance! You don’t bother about the morality 
of these legs!...What you want is to go where they are going. 
C’est plaisir à les voir marcher sur ce bitume, la robe retrousée lestement, d’un 
côté, jusqu’au genou, de façon à laisser étinceler au soleil une jambe fine et 
nerveuse comme celle d’un cheval arabe, pleine de frémissements et d’impatiences 
adorables, et terminée par un brodequin d’une élégance irréprochable! On ne s’oc-
cupe pas de la moralité de ces jambes-là!...Ce qu’on veut, c’est aller où elles vont. 
(P I 634; AP 509) 
Doubtless we may see one form of dialectic at a standstill here in the luxuri-
ous refinement of an arab horse treading the tawdry asphalt of the rue des 
Martyres. But a scholar of biopolitics must also surely note the bad faith of 
the desire to ‘go where they go’. For, really, they are going nowhere; nowhere 
that is not already determined by the desire of the buyer, and marking time 
until a sale is made. Their steps serve only to display their wares; to display 
 
19 In a bizarre passage towards the end of B Mode, Benjamin speculates that woman must have 
achieved erect posture later than man (P I 131-32; AP 80-81). But the art of the Parisian street 
strongly associates feminine sexuality with artful walking. 
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themselves as wares. The prostitute thus shares this with the nymphs that 
drive the mill-wheel, and with Fraulein Schnellbring: each is animated only 
in the service of others. Indeed, one might say that they are all variants on the 
domestic labour that Hannah Arendt, another of Agamben’s touchstones, as-
sociates with the mere reproduction of life processes below the pale of polit-
ical life, and which has perhaps less to hope for from biopolitics than any 
other sphere of life.20 Like mitochondria, necessary to the functioning of 
every cell yet forever debarred from the drama of coding, such a thing may 
naturally power the dialectical understanding of an other, yet never take a 
single step forward in its own right. 
This is also what underwrites the cruellest of dialectical reversals, in 
which the work such ancillary figures perform for us comes to appear as de-
pendency on us.21 Agamben, indeed, suggests that nymphs depend, for the 
life they selflessly donate to us, on our attention. Like signatures, which ‘may 
easily escape [sfuggire] the gaze of the historian’ (SR 33), nymphs, being 
fugitive, require a certain look. Without this, their ‘life’—since it is only po-
tential, lacking the spark of an oppositely-charged pole—is curiously close 
to death. Thus it is ‘only in the encounter with a living individual that images 
 
20 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 2nd edn (London: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
21 For the work of the ancillary, see also Stephen Thomson, ‘Ancillary Narratives: Maids, Sleep-




can reacquire polarity and life’ (N 35; emphasis mine). Left to their own de-
vices, they have a tendency to ‘harden into spectres’, ‘a irrigidirsi in spettri’, 
and they need art and art criticism to restore them to life: ‘di restituirle alla 
vita’ (N 22). In this regard, the collage technique of Warburg’s Pa-
thosformeln is once more exemplary, for it kindles the flicker of Nachleben 
(afterlife or survival) that subsists in images, so as to restore their energy: 
‘restituire loro energia’ (N 25).  
We are back, thus, to a sort of reader response theory; but one now 
tinged with a curious erotics, which takes a baroque turn with Paracelsus. His 
nymphs, belonging to a second order of creation—between man and animal, 
and made by God in the image of man rather than of Himself—have no soul 
(N 40). But they can acquire one if they join in sexual union with a man, and 
produce with him a son: ‘se si uniscono sessualmente con un uomo e gen-
erano con lui un figlio’ (N 43). Clearly this gendering is part and parcel of 
the conventions of courtly love on which Agamben now draws. For Paracel-
sus, the nymph names the object of passionate love par excellence: ‘la ninfa 
nomina l’oggetto per eccellenza della passione amorosa’ (N 39). And in Boc-
caccio’s Corbaccio, to love means to love a nymph: ‘amare significa amare 
una ninfa’ (N 47). In countersigning these discourses, however, Agamben 
seems not at all concerned to put their gendering into question. Rather we are 
to attend to the more important, epochal matter of the birth of modern litera-
ture out of a scission in the mediaevel imago: ‘La letteratura moderna nasce, 
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in questo senso, da une scissione dell’imago medievale’ (N 50). This fracture 
or ‘cæsura’ is exemplied in Boccaccio’s quip, which also provides Ninfe with 
its epigraph, that the Muses are women, only they don’t piss: ‘Egli è vero che 
tutte son femine, ma non pisciano’ (N 49). Boccaccio breaks with the epoch 
of Dante insofar as he opts to affirm the ‘cæsura’ between reality and imagi-
nation, rather than ‘suture’ it (N 49). Perhaps the ‘brusque realism’ with 
which real, pissing women are distinguished from nymphs, is meant to have 
done with the question of gender, by indicating that it exists on another plane. 
And perhaps there is a certain naivety in thinking that Agamben’s nymphs 
simply are women. And yet femininity is constantly needed as one pole of 
the non-adequation of the real and the concept which produces a sublime or 
farcical fracture (‘una sublime o farsesca frattura’) in the imagination, the 
very place where Mediaeval thought hoped to find a secure connection be-
tween the phenomenal world and thought: ‘congiunzione fra il mondo sensi-
bile e il pensiero’. 
 
Sheaths 
Having thus delivered the modern out of a cleft in the imaginary, Agamben 
goes on to outline the prospectus for a final liberation from images. This the-
matic is closer to the thematics of homo sacer than one might at first suspect. 
The two topics come into their closest proximity in a section of La communità 
che viene (1990) to which I will turn presently, and which might be said to 
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play an enigmatic and little-remarked part in the genesis of the Agambenian 
concept of homo sacer. As Leland de la Durantaye tells us,  this was a long 
process: Agamben first broached the term as far back as 1982 in Il linguaggio 
e la morte (pp.131-32), and developed it in essays of the early ’90s such as 
‘Beyond Human Rights’ (1993) and ‘Form of life’ (1993).22 In the midst of 
this process, in the peroration of La comunità che viene, Agamben condemns 
our culture’s ‘hypocritical dogma of the sacredness of bare life’; hypocritical, 
he goes on to explain, because bare life is ‘sacred’ only in the sense of homo 
sacer: excluded from the world of men, and able to be killed without homi-
cide.23 Against this he wagers the ‘singolarità qualunque’, a human subject 
that owes its ‘singularity’ to no attributes or qualities, and is thus qualifiable 
only as ‘qualunque’, or ‘whatever’. The ‘simple absence of conditions’ may 
seem to bring this subject perilously close to bare life, but Agamben’s claim 
is that it can finally bring us to the threshold ‘of belonging itself’: ‘dell’ap-
partenenza stessa’ (CCV 67). And in this there is the hope of a new sort of 
collectivity, exemplified by the crowds in Tianenmen Square who were 
united by no determinate claim (CCV 69). In a postscript of 2001, Agamben 
casts himself as having outlived (sopravvissuto) such hopes, yet still manages 
to wrangle this very belatedness—as one who lives ‘after the last day’, in a 
 
22 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2009), pp.206-8. 
23 Giorgio Agamben, La comunità che viene (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2001; repr. 2008), p.68. 
First publ. 1990. 
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time in which all have ‘found themselves in the position of a relic [resto]’—
into an ‘unprecedented generalisation of the messianic condition’ (CCV 91-
92). 
Agamben finds salvation in the unlikeliest places. In an earlier section 
of La comunità, entitled ‘Collants Dim’, he finds it in a 1970s advert for the 
said affordable brand of tights, featuring a line of models all dancing to the 
same tune, yet filmed separately. The ‘minimal discrepancy [minimo scarto] 
in their gestures’ that resulted wafted towards the spectators ‘a promise of 
happiness that unequivocally concerned the human body’ (CCV 41). Agam-
ben sets his analysis in the lineage of Kracauer and Benjamin, who found in 
capitalism’s increasing marketisation of the human body the ‘corrupt text of 
a prophecy’ of capitalism’s beyond. For this marketisation had at least one 
positive feature: to redeem the body of the stigma of ineffability (riscattarlo 
dallo stigma di ineffabilita, CCV 42). The most evidently reified bodies may 
thus have a preeminent role in ‘the age-old [secolare] process of emancipa-
tion of the human form from its theological foundations’. So it is in mechan-
ically reproduced pornography that, ‘neither generic nor individual, neither 
images of divinity nor of the animal form, the body became now truly what-
ever’ (CCV 42). Here, however, we come to an important scission. For it is 
‘not the body that has been technicised, but its image’. Behind the ‘transfig-
ured body [corpo glorioso]’ of publicity, ‘the tiny, fragile human body con-
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tinues its precarious existence’, and the ‘geometric splendour of the show-
girls covers the long line of anonymous denuded figures to the death camps, 
or the daily carnage of the motorway’ (CCV 43-44). The challenge, then, is 
to appropriate what capitalism wants to confine to the realm of spectacle; to 
‘interpenetrate [compenetrare] image and body in a space in which they can 
no longer be separated’, so as to produce the indifferentiation of the qualun-
que: 
this is the good [il bene] that humanity must learn to wrest from the commodity 
[merce] at sunset. Advertising and pornography, which accompany it to the tomb 
as mourners, are the unknowing midwives of this new body of humanity. 
questo è il bene che l’umanita deve saper strappare alla merce a tramonto. La pub-
blicità e la pornografia, che l’accompagnano alla tomba come prefiche, sono le 
inconsapevoli levatrici di questo nuovo corpo dell’umanita (CCV 44) 
One has to pay close attention to the detail of the sublation of the commodity 
on which this apocalypse depends, and according to which a new good (bene) 
will be raised from the abolition of goods (merce). What the negative moment 
of this process will destroy is the ‘corpo glorioso’, the false promise of trans-
figuration held out by advertising. As a line of mourners on their way to the 
bonfire of the vanities, these rhyme uneasily with the queue for the camps 
invoked shortly before. But in this holocaust, we are assured, it is only the 
image-commodity that will perish. It is a line of argument that comes dan-
gerously close to suggesting that National Socialist racial policy was guilty 
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mainly of a category error. Meanwhile, the spirit of ‘qualunque’ identity, 
hitherto sequestered by capitalism in the fetish, is now set free to permeate 
the body. Any sniggering at the back prompted by the claim that a line of 
dancing girls might waft a ‘promise of happiness that unequivocally con-
cerned the human body’ is thus silenced. To think that this had anything to 
do with women’s legs was a vulgar error; only the ‘minimo scarto’ between 
them concerns us, for in this we glimpse the whatever, ‘whose physis is re-
semblance’. 
And yet this simultaneous deployment and abolition of the gendering 
of the specular object will not quite do. Although Agamben notes in passing, 
in parenthesis, that the massive manipulation of the human body we see today 
does concern ‘above all the feminine one’, the examples of such manipula-
tion that follow are somewhat equivocal. After remarking that ‘the opacity of 
sexual differences has been refuted [smentita] by the transsexual body’, 
Agamben goes on to remark that mortality has been brought into question by 
the ‘body without organs of the commodity’ (CCV 43). The implication that 
the transsexual body played a large role in advertising, or even pornography, 
in 1991 is intriguing. At any rate, it seems these bodies may be, in their ca-
pacity to blur boundaries and disarticulate, among the products of the capi-
talist imaginary that pave the way for the qualunque status which the ‘real’ 
body will inherit. If this is so, then it seems the ‘whatever’ state will be as 
indifferent to sexual difference as it is to anything else. In the meantime, 
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however, the boundary that man will have to cross to reach this state is still 
somewhat overdetermined by sexual difference. Agamben has, after all, only 
just cited ‘the dream of Pygmalion’ as the exemplar of the aspiration to break 
down ‘the organic barriers that impede the unconditioned human claim to 
happiness’. Pygmalion’s technical solution is ‘not simply to form an image 
for the body, but another body for the image’ ( CCV 43). In the meantime—
I keep returning to this phrase, I think, because I simply do not believe in 
Agamben’s apocalypses; in their ability to reveal something purely formal 
that dispenses with what they substantially show—in the meantime, we have 
to ask why this universal promise of happiness comes sheathed in the image 
of female bodies sheathed (inguainate; CCV 43) in tights.24 
 
Castrati 
Agamben returns to Pygmalion in L’Uomo senza contenuto (1994). But here 
art’s promise of happiness—this time explicitly derived from Stendhal’s 
‘promesse de bonheur’ as quoted by Nietzsche—concerns the happiness of 
the artist, which marks a turn against Kantian aesthetics, the disinterest of the 
spectator, and indeed the spectator in general.25 The problem, Agamben sug-
gests, is that the artwork is now so mediated by aesthetics and the canons of 
 
24 The space is lacking to do justice to ‘l’argument de la gaine’, or argument of the sheath, that 
Derrida explores in Glas and Éperons, but some of its effects will presently become apparent. 
25 Giorgio Agamben, L’uomo senza contenuto 4th edn (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2005), pp.9-10. 
First edn 1994. 
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taste that it occurs ‘independently of any content’, and this is why, pace Rob-
ert Musil, the man of Agamben’s title is ‘without content’. This idea quickly 
gives rise to ideas of violence and cutting. The cut lies in aesthetics itself: the 
Kantian relation of spectator to image produces an alienation of self in other 
which amounts to a ‘laceration’ (USC 57). Only artists such as Rimbaud or 
Artaud who embrace alienation have the chance to ‘to remake [rifare] their 
own body and reconcile their own laceration’ (USC 83). Thus the art of late 
modernity is characterised by a series of preemptive cuts: in the ready-made, 
pop art, and the work-in-progress, the artwork has taken it upon itself to ‘strip 
itself [spogliarsi] of its aesthetic potential’ (95), to bring ‘privation’ itself to 
presence (96), to ‘consciously assume’ its own ‘impotence’ (99). Whether 
these strategies are successful is not, perhaps, entirely clear, but they are at 
any rate apotropaics against the greatest privation of all which would be the 
loss of art itself to its alienation in aesthetics. 
What man risks losing with the artwork is not, in fact, simply a cultural good, 
however precious, and not even the privileged expression of his creative energy, 
but the very space of his world, in which alone he can find himself as man and be 
capable of action and knowledge. 
Quel che l’uomo rischia di perdere con l’opera d’arte non è, infatti, semplicemente 
un bene culturale, per quanto prezioso, e nemmeno l’espressione privilegiata della 
sua energia creatrice: ma è lo spazio stesso del suo mondo, nel quale soltanto egli 
può trovarsi come uomo ed essere capace di azione e di conoscenza. (USC 155) 
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There are practically no women in L’uomo senza contenuto. But they are in-
cluded everywhere in the folds of a convoluted argument that bristles with 
the logic of a word it never utters: castration. How else are we to construe the 
heroism of the artist who believes he has ‘really penetrated into a zone where 
no other man would want to follow, in the proximity of a risk that menaces 
him more profoundly than any other mortal’ (USC 83)? Then there is the 
flirtation, seeded by Nietzsche’s idea of the artwork ‘that gives birth  [parto-
risce] to itself’ (108), with ideas of sexless generation; of the ‘autoproduction 
of man’ (125), and of art as ‘the eternal autogeneration of the will to power’ 
(140). This ‘auto-’ of self-affection also seems to have something to do with 
the utopian moment in which artist and spectator may rediscover common 
ground and let art be (USC 154). What, then, is this utopia if not a community 
of anxious phalluses that have agreed amongst themselves to a simulacrum 
of humiliation so as to avoid the ultimate peril of involution into the sheath? 
It would be easy to show that castration is a key signature in Agam-
ben’s diagnosis of the plight of modern man. Thus, under Guy Debord’s 
‘spectacle’, in which the capitalist imaginary finally usurps reality, ‘the prac-
tical power of man is detached from itself and presents itself as a world apart 
[un mondo a sé]’ (CCV 63). Of course, one might object that this formulation 
is gender-neutral, and that any gender polarities arising are just part of the 
antique décor of the sources from which Agamben elaborates his conceptual 
parables. Thus, the role of elementary spirits as ‘the ideal archetype of any 
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separation of man from himself [dell’uomo da se stesso]’ may be, on occa-
sion, illustrated by a determinedly female nymph’s pursuit of a soul through 
sexual congress with an equally and oppositely determined human ‘man’ (N 
42). But this gendering would be purely the affair of Paracelsus, and extrinsic 
to Agamben’s more pressing conceptual ends. We would accept, thus, that 
‘nymph’ simply means ‘image’, and that it is really ‘images’ that are the place 
of mankind’s ‘incessant lack to itself’ (N 52-53).  
Similarly, in the account of the cabbalistic parable of the ‘isolation of 
the Shekinah’ with which Agamben glosses Debord’s spectacle (CCV 63-
65), it would be a matter of sheer indifference that he fails to mention the 
conventional feminine gendering of the Shekinah, of which he is nevertheless 
presumably aware through his reading of Gershom Scholem.26 The important 
point would be that the rabbi who, upon entering paradise, takes cuttings from 
the trees rather than contemplating the entirety of creation, thus alienates the 
Shekinah—God’s immanence or ‘speech’—from the divine presence as a 
whole and so reprises the sin of Adam, ‘separates the tree of science from 
that of life’, and initiates the process that reaches its endgame in the spectacle. 
Why dwell on the (inevitable) gendering of Adam and the rabbis? Why pause 
to deconstruct the massive historical gendering of the opposition of active 
 
26 Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism 3rd edn rev. with a foreword by Robert 




science to passive nature when we can, simply by realising that linguistic 
alienation is what we all have in common, aspire to be like the other rabbi in 
the tale, who enters and exits the garden (of language) unharmed?27 
Agamben’s (incredible) wager is thus that he can project a utopian fu-
ture, in which difference will cease to signify, out of texts whose conceptual 
present is nevertheless tacitly organised by a massively insistent gendering, 
more or less passively inherited from the past. It is a road that leads from 
disavowal to disavowal, bearing within it at every step the undigested thought 
of femininity as the supplement of ‘man’.28 Perhaps the surest, certainly the 
most active, sign of this disavowal and of the hollowness of the utopian fu-
ture, is the way in which, in the meantime, Agamben cleaves (silently) to 
castration. Thus, Agamben insists that Henry Darger’s Vivian Girls are with-
out question nymphs, even though ‘munite di un piccolo sesso maschile’ (N 
20); that is ‘equipped with a little male sex organ’. As equipment, the penis 
is an excrescence, something that has been arbitrarily added, and that can, 
and ought to, be removed so as to restore these ‘girls’ to their natural state as 
the already-castrated. Having thus disposed of them, Agamben does not 
waste any more time on these irrelevant organs, or on any confusion of the 
 
27 It would be interesting to compare this with Jean Paulhan’s parable of the sign forbidding the 
bearing of cut flowers into the garden in Les Fleurs de Tarbe (1936/1941). See Jean Paulhan, 
Œuvres complètes III (Paris: Gallimard, 2011). 
28 Juliana Schiesari’s comments on the tacit gendering of melancholia and its absent object are 
highly pertinent here. See Juliana Schiesari, The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psycho-




gender schema they might entail. Rather, he moves swifly on to a more com-
fortable, more familiar sort of cut, hailing Darger’s images for the ‘effect of 
extraordinary modernity’ that comes from their collage composition out of 
clippings (N 21).  
Agamben’s attachment to an essential cutness of the image is not, thus, 
simply a matter of art history. He needs this thing that is cut off or isolated 
yet also uncannily resembling. But, to manage its supplementarity and the 
menace this poses to identity, he also needs it to be gendered feminine. In 
this sense, curiously enough, the feminine image in Agamben is the phallus. 
It is the site of an absconded sovereignty; a masterful power of which Agam-
ben is ostensibly the implacable critic, but to which his own critique relent-
lessly aspires. For if Agamben’s writing is often compelling, it is not least 
through a certain pose of heroism evinced by its subject; a highwire act that 
snatches victory from the jaws of defeat through a dialectical pirouette. It is 
not just, as Derrida has argued, that Agamben’s rage to declare himself first, 
or the first to recognise who was first, places him in the sovereign position.29 
This is only the symptom of a hankering after the splendid isolation of a 
monad after which everything must follow. Agamben’s discourse compels 
through the sort of masterful orchestration that can manœuvre a line of danc-
ing girls and the queue of abject bodies awaiting the gas chamber into a single 
 
29 Jacques Derrida, Séminaire: La bête et le souverain I (Paris: Galilée, 2008), pp.134-39. 
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cortège. For all that we are invited to participate critically in the horror, it is 
from a bird’s-eye vantage point that can survey a desolated world teeming 
with infinitely exposed, helpless humanity. In this inferno, no hand reaches 
out to grasp us, no voice to hail us, as we pass. Its subjects are the marion-
nettes of our disenchanted desire. But they are also, thus, the disavowed prin-
ciple, and the indispensable vehicles, of a mastery we cannot properly incor-
porate, only nostalgically, by proxy; which is to say, the phallus. Derrida’s 
remarks on the phallic properties and the gendering of the marionnette seem 
pertinent here. 
It [elle] brings to mind the phallus, for all that it remains sometimes a little girl, 
and the taste, the fascination, the modes and the genres that cultivate the marion-
nette or the marionnette theatre, would thus participate in the phallic cult. 
Elle fait penser au phallus, toute fillette qu’elle reste parfois, et le goût, la fascina-
tion, les modes et les genres qui cultivent la marionnette ou le théâtre de la mari-
onnette participeraient ainsi du culte phallique. (La bête I 296) 
Exilic and nostalgic as the condition of its messianism, Agamben’s discourse 
lives the agony and the ecstasy of this cult. Dissolving the cult would not 
mean simply disavowing the phallus, but acknowledging it as an operator 
within the complex field of gendered determinations that are a part of the 
inherited conceptuality with which we must all deal, and which cannot be 
conjured away through any masterful pose of indifference. 
If I keep returning to Derrida in these concluding remarks, it is because 
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his patient charting of the convoluted imbrication of power and gender in ‘la 
bête’ and ‘le souverain’, and elsewhere, seems to me to suggest that a dis-
course on power that excludes gender is also inevitably a discourse of power 
over gender, securing its certainty at the expense of femininity-as-difference, 
and offering a relation to power that cannot be corrected by the mere inter-
polation of gender criticism. Derrida’s remarks, in The Politics of Friendship, 
on one of Agamben’s sources, Carl Schmitt, seem to me highly pertinent. 
Derrida points out that Schmitt’s vision of history and politics as an affair of 
warring brotherhoods never speaks of the sister.30 Indeed, this history is a 
‘desert’, seen ‘from very far and very high up’, full of men, through centuries 
of war: ‘You would seek in vain a single figure of a woman, a feminine sil-
houette, and the least allusion to sexual difference’ (Politics 179). But this 
‘blindness’, Derrida suggests, ‘gives one food for thought’: ‘what if woman 
were [...] the other absolute enemy of this theory of the absolute enemy’ (Pol-
itics 181)? Of course, Agamben might say, like so many other left critics who 
have drawn on Schmitt’s thinking, that he does not need to accept everything 
Schmitt has to say: that an enemy is necessary to the foundation of any polity, 
that war is therefore the condition of politics, and so forth. But he does seem, 
like Hannah Arendt—another declared influence, through whom his vision 
of Schmitt is filtered—to exclude relations between men and women from 
 




the political, as belonging to the universally human, the mere life process and 
so forth. And his map of the process of depoliticisation coincides, as Derrida 
suggests it does in Schmitt—and as, indeed, it does in Arendt—with the his-
tory of women’s long, slow, and still incomplete, accession to political power 
(Politics 182-83).  
Agamben does not ostensibly share Arendt’s patrician nostalgia for the 
agora of Greek antiquity in which men would appear in the world only 
through speech and action, liberated from the mere reproduction of the do-
mestic sphere, and even from the sphere of ‘work’ whose ‘erections’ give us 
world.31 But he does share a vision of history in which ‘the actions of men 
appear like the gestures of puppets’ (Arendt 185). He also exercises the ‘hu-
man surveying capacity’ whereby man ‘withdraws himself to a distance from 
everything near him’ (Arendt 251). And when he does, what he, like Schmitt, 
sees is a desert of men; men who have, moreover, become almost incompre-
hensibly impotent through a process of depoliticisation that leaves them ex-
posed to politics in its most fundamental and violent guise, and who can con-
sole themselves only by regaling themselves with the spectacle either of this 
impotence itself as if from a great distance of critical wisdom, as if it were 
other, or of that other other that is near to hand, the image of woman. Never 
will the thought intrude into this schema that its unhappiness is at least in part 
 
31 On the ‘erection of a world of things’ see esp. The Human Condition, pp.144-55. 
40  
 
not the unhappiness of the world pure and simple, but of the discourse itself, 
its quest for mastery, and its hopeless inability to offer any account of this 
sundering within itself. As I suggested at the outset, the byzantine architec-
ture of this effort to erect a pastiche phallus has nothing to offer feminism, if 
not the challenge of starting to dismantle it. 
